Richard Bellamy by Bellamy, R.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1531651
2
Richard Bellamy
Professor of Political Science
University College London, UK
Why were you initially drawn to political philosophy?
The Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico famously dated
his philosophical vocation to when he was dropped on his head
as a baby. I can recall no such single moment of enlightenment.
I came to political philosophy via an interest in contemporary
politics informed by the history of ideas. Though I now mainly
employ the idiom of Anglo-American analytical political and legal
philosophy to tackle current issues, arriving at this point has been
rather a long journey and my approach still bears the marks of
my historical origins. So, I think it is justiﬁed in this context to
tell the somewhat lengthy tale of how I was drawn to political
philosophy as it is predominantly understood today.
Politics and philosophy were not taught in schools in the UK in
the 1970s, and I do not remember my teachers being particularly
political or philosophical. But I had some truly outstanding Eng-
lish and History teachers and these subjects enthused me most.
That said, I was always interested in more theoretical approaches
to them than we ever got in class. So, largely inspired by my eldest
brother, who was reading philosophy at the University of York, I
began to tentatively explore a somewhat mixed bag of thinkers. As
I recall, Nietzsche and Sartre ﬁgured strongly — neither of whom
Ic a nc l a i mt or e a dm u c ht h e s ed a y s—b u tIa l s or e m e m b e rd e l v -
ing into Hume and Wittgenstein. What I do not recall reading
was any political philosophy, which was — and I suspect still is
— very much a poor relation in British philosophy departments.
Certainly, for my brother logic and metaphysics formed the core
of the discipline. Perhaps for that reason I never really considered
doing philosophy myself because I was already fairly politically
minded. My family was quite political and intellectually engaged,Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1531651
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with my father and other brother doing their bit in local politics.
This familial background fed into my school work and stimulated
an interest in the role ideas, particularly political ideas, played in
literature and history. In diﬀerent ways, George Steiner and Ray-
mond Williams both had a big inﬂuence here and probably led
me to go up to Cambridge to read English. Before the end of my
ﬁrst term, though, I had switched to History.
When I arrived in Cambridge I not heard of the ‘history of polit-
ical thought’, let alone the ‘Cambridge School’. In fact, I cannot
remember any one using the latter term during my undergrad-
uate career. However, one of the great things about Cambridge
at that time was that lectures were more open events for lec-
turers to intrigue and entertain students, than formal parts of
the teaching programme. One really went for the show. I soon
found myself attending far more lectures in philosophy and his-
tory than in English, though I did suﬃciently enjoy those by the
notoriously obscure poet Jeremy Prynne to go to them two years
running — thereby discovering that although identical in every
respect, including dramatic pauses, they also elicited identically
rapt responses from the audience. Had politics existed at Cam-
bridge, I would no doubt have sampled that too — but ‘social and
political sciences’ was then just a committee rather than a de-
partment, oﬀering a mixture of history, psychology, sociology and
economics courses that could be combined to form Part 2 of a
degree programme but not Part 1. I found the philosophy lec-
tures stimulating, but I was also a bit daunted by them and it
was clear moral and political philosophy had a rather lowly status
at Cambridge. The historians of political thought were a diﬀer-
ent matter. Quentin Skinner — a famously eﬀective lecturer - was
then based at Princeton, so sadly I did not hear him, though in
my second year I did participate in an amazing pre-exam ‘class’ he
ran for some 200 students in which he coordinated a remarkably
intimate and spontaneous seeming — yet in reality extraordinarily
well coordinated - discussion of the set texts. But I soon became
an assiduous follower of Richard Tuck, Duncan Forbes and Roy
Porter–all, in their very diﬀerent ways, also extremely stimulat-
ing lecturers. They showed me how it was possible to philosophise
about politics while seeing ideas as ﬁrmly grounded in and engaged
with a given political and intellectual context. As I’ll note in an-
swer to question 3 below on the relation of political philosophy to
political action, I regard the way this kind of historical approach
takes that relationship seriously by seeing ideas as political acts2. Richard Bellamy 15
as one of its great strengths.
Having changed to history, I ended up taking every intellec-
tual history paper then available, with Duncan Forbes and Roy
Porter more or less supervising me for all of them. Both ded-
icated scholars of the Enlightenment, Duncan was a somewhat
urbane, rational Scot, whereas Roy seemed like a ﬁgure out of
Henry Fielding who drank sherry by the tankard and somewhat
disconcertingly expected you to do so too. Roy supervised my un-
dergraduate dissertation, which almost a decade later became my
ﬁrst publication in a refereed journal–a study of William Godwin
and the Romantic Poets published as ‘William Godwin and the
Development of the “New Man of Feeling”’, History of Political
Thought, VI, (1985) pp. 41132. As the topic indicates, my route
to political philosophy was still very much entrenched in English
and History. Most attention on this topic had centred on God-
win’s inﬂuence on the romantic poets. I switched focus to look at
their inﬂuence on him — especially in the writings post-Political
Justice, including his novels — a change I related to diﬃculties
with his earlier utilitarianism. I also took Roy’s special subject on
the development of Geology as a discipline in the eighteenth cen-
tury. Originally, I planned to carry forward these interests and do
a PhD with him on the links between the scientiﬁc and political
ideas of Joseph Priestley. Had I done so, I might well have pursed
a career as an intellectual historian. However, just after my ﬁnals
Roy moved to the Welcome Institute in London to embark on his
series of studies into the history of medicine. As a result, I turned
to my other Cambridge mentor, Duncan Forbes, as a potential
doctoral supervisor.
Though best known as a path breaking scholar of the Scottish
Enlightenment, a ﬁeld that his teaching as much as his writings did
much to create, for students of my generation his renown rested
mainly on his quite remarkable series of lectures on Hegel. True
to the spirit of the time, the vast bulk of these were devoted not
to the set book, The Philosophy of Right, but to a text that was
not part of the syllabus — The Phenomenology of Spirit.A sw e l la s
the Hume to Marx history of political thought paper, Duncan also
supervised me for a rather odd paper called ‘Historians and Histor-
ical Thought: From Bossuet to Burkhardt’. This paper had been
devised by the seventeenth century scholar, Brian Wormald. A
Catholic convert, his thesis — delivered in his rooms in Peterhouse
to the six or so students brave or mad enough to have opted for
this somewhat unusual course — was that things had pretty much16 2. Richard Bellamy
been downhill from Bossuet onwards, though Wormald himself
was tormented by spiritual doubts arising from God’s will not
being as clearly discernable in the way of the world as he might
have wished. Fortunately, no such angst bedevilled Forbes’s read-
ing of these texts. Rather, the paper kindled an interest in the
philosophy of history and of the relationship of political thinking
a n da c t i n gt od i ﬀerent understandings of its past. Vico seemed a
key ﬁgure in this context and I now suggested to Duncan that I
might write my PhD on him. He proposed thinking more gener-
ally about Vico and the Scottish and Neapolitan Enlightenments,
a potential set of inﬂuences he had alluded to in an early article
of the 1950s, and gave me a few names of famous Italian scholars
I might go and visit., Like many of his generation, Duncan had
not written a PhD himself and took a somewhat cavalier attitude
to supervising one, and after what was our sole meeting to discuss
the dissertation shook my hand and with his inimitable chuckle
said ‘see you in three years with your magnum opus’.S i xm o n t h s
and an intensive Italian course later, I set oﬀ by train to Turin
and Naples having written to the academics on Duncan’s list.
Though I did eventually write articles on both the Neapolitan
and Scottish Enlightenments partly based on my research at this
time, and also produced an edition of Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes
and Punishments for Cambridge University Press, I soon discov-
ered that this material did not really connect with the philosophi-
cal question that most engaged me–namely how was our present
thought and action shaped by a confrontation with past thought
and actions. However, that issue was very much at the heart of
the twentieth century Italian philosopher, Benedetto Croce, whose
work I became acquainted with as a result of reading his studies of
Vico and the Neapolitan Enlightenment. I now decided to change
topic and write my dissertation on him. While, Duncan’s Hegel
lectures and teaching had in many ways inspired the topic, this
also seemed a convenient occasion to get a slightly more proac-
tive supervisor. Fortunately, Quentin Skinner had just returned
to Cambridge to the Chair of Political Science. I had now read his
methodological essays and thought there was some commonality
of themes with my thesis topic, and luckily for me he agreed to
take me on. Meanwhile, I had decided that it would be helpful to
have an Italian base and had successfully applied to the European
University Institute in Florence, which then allowed students to
be registered for their degree at another university. The upshot
of that experience was that I came into contact for the ﬁrst time2. Richard Bellamy 17
with political scientists and so began my academic political edu-
cation. As part of my work on Croce I also started to read Pareto
and Mosca and I now became interested in the historical origins
of current understandings of political behaviour–a topic that I
was later to develop.
My eventual PhD was somewhat eccentric in many ways, being
as much a study of the inﬂuence of Croce’s politics on his philos-
ophy of history as an exploration of the relationship of political
thought to its past. Along the way, though, I had become thor-
oughly educated in the social and political philosophy as well as
the politics of his times–a resource I was to draw on in what
is often seen as my major book Liberalism and Modern Society:
An Historical Argument (Polity and Penn State University Press,
1992). What I still lacked was any systematic grounding in con-
temporary political philosophy. That only came when I went as a
post-doctoral research fellow to Nuﬃeld College, Oxford. ‘Social
being determines consciousness’, and in that context I soon found
myself taking a crash course in Hart, Berlin, Rawls, and their heirs,
attending the famous set piece discussions between Dworkin, Sen,
Parﬁtt and later Cohen, and engaging in conversations with the
extraordinarily rich seam of political and legal philosophers in Ox-
ford at that time, which included along with these four not only
David Miller, Joseph Raz, John Finnis, John Gray, Steven Lukes,
Michael Freeden, Alan Ryan, Mark Philip, and Nicola Lacey but
also, then as doctoral students, Leslie Green, Chandran Kukathas,
Adam Swift, Andrew Williams and Keith Dowding–the last two
having the room next to mine in Nuﬃeld. I guess I inaugurated
my career as a contemporary political theorist with the very ﬁrst
paper to the now renowned Nuﬃeld Political Theory seminar that
I started in my rooms in 1984. It was ‘Sex, Sin and Liberalism’,
exploring the issue of pornography and freedom of speech and
rehashing the Hart-Devlin debate. However, I was at that stage
still more a historian of political thought than a political theo-
rist, and in fact at the end of my Nuﬃeld fellowship returned
to Cambridge as a colleague of Richard Tuck’s at Jesus College,
Cambridge, where I became a college lecturer in modern Euro-
pean history. The shift in focus really only came when I replaced
Jeremy Waldron in the Edinburgh politics department in 1987,
and became responsible for teaching the contemporary political
philosophy paper and participated in the highly stimulating ju-
risprudence reading group organised by Neil MacCormick in Law.
A ﬁnal transformation, turning me towards being a theorist of18 2. Richard Bellamy
politics, in the sense of addressing the normative qualities and
role of political activity and its organisation rather than more
general issues of justice, was brought about when I took up the
Chair in Politics at the University of East Anglia in 1992. There
I had the wonderful experience of teaching the Philosophy, Poli-
tics and Economics programme alongside Martin Hollis and Bob
Sugden. Martin was very much the team leader of this enterprise
and had conceived the course as a dialogue between the three dis-
ciplines in which we were all supposed to defend our own turf.
As a result, I was forced to think about what, if anything, was so
special about political decision-making per se.T h a tp r e o c c u p a -
tion led me to explore the resources of republicanism, particularly
the neo-Roman version favoured by Quentin Skinner and Philip
Pettit, and to criticise the liberal retreat from politics in my Lib-
eralism and Pluralism: Towards a Politics of Compromise (Rout-
ledge, 1999). This concern has deepened since. Though I beneﬁted
tremendously from co-teaching with two eminent political philoso-
phers and co-contributors to this volume, Andrew Mason and An-
drew Williams, when I went to Reading in 1996, the centre of my
attention turned increasingly to looking empirically as well as nor-
matively at the virtues of actually existing democratic systems. A
move to Britain’s pre-eminent political science department at the
University of Essex as Professor of Government further stimulated
that investigation, culminating in my Political Constitutionalism
(Cambridge University Press, 2007). Often in collaboration with
others, notably Dario Castiglione, I have also pursued this topic in
numerous studies of democracy, constitutionalism and citizenship
within the EU, the likely subject of my next book.
What do you consider your own most important contribu-
tion(s) to political philosophy, and why?
My most important contributions have probably been my three
main books to date. Despite their apparently diﬀerent topics and
approaches, they are linked by the common theme of exploring
the underpinnings and character of liberal democracy. My ﬁrst
two books, Modern Italian Social Theory: Ideology and Politics
from Pareto to the Present, (Polity and Stanford University Press,
1987) and Liberalism and Modern Society were attempts to mix
history and political theory. As I remarked in the preface to the
ﬁrst, my aim was to reach ‘Oxford destinations by the Cambridge
road’, and the second had as its subtitle ‘an historical argument’.2. Richard Bellamy 19
In other words, in each case I was using history to make a philo-
sophical point. However, though widely reviewed in philosophy as
well as politics and history journals, they have been looked on
mainly as interesting works of scholarship rather than as contri-
butions to political philosophy in their own right.
The underlying theoretical issue in Modern Italian Social The-
ory was the origins and character of the modern liberal democratic
state. With the partial exception of Croce, all the Italian theorists
I looked at — both the positivists and the idealists — regarded pol-
itics as epiphenomenal. It reﬂected either certain universal psy-
chological dispositions of human beings, as Pareto believed, or a
given social and economic stage of development, as in diﬀerent
ways Mosca and Gramsci thought, or was the product of a given
cultural consciousness, as Gentile and, in part, Croce, argued. As
a result, none of these thinkers saw any independent virtue in
liberal democracy. Thus, for Pareto it was simply a method for
manipulating human passions, for Gramsci a historical stage to
be superseded and so on. Though they were right to stress the
socio-economic and cultural preconditions of liberal democracy,
they had little or no appreciation of its possessing any norma-
tive value. Indeed, they were all somewhat dismissive of politics,
regarding it as a transitional phenomenon occasioned by certain
psychological failings, an absence of cultural unity, the conﬂicts
attending a disorganised system of social and economic produc-
tion, or some mixture of these.
The book attempted to show how many prevailing notions about
how liberal democratic states work — not least dominant views of
their failings — might have somewhat uncomfortable historical ori-
gins, resting on largely unarticulated assumptions inherited from
the past that would hardly stand up to scrutiny today. For ex-
ample, current views about the nature and shortcomings of mass
democracy rest to a remarkable degree on arguments ﬁrst articu-
l a t e db yP a r e t oa n dM o s c at h a tr e ﬂect the failings of the system
in turn of the century Italy, on the one hand, and the bogus social
psychology of the time, on the other. In the concluding chapter,
I also attempted to develop an argument for democracy as justi-
ﬁed by the shortcomings of any social theory to fully ground its
claims in ways that pre-empted all disagreement. In many ways,
that sketched my agenda for much of my later work.
Similar themes run through Liberalism and Modern Society.T h e
debate between liberals and communitarians was raging during
the period it was written (roughly from 1987-92). A prominent20 2. Richard Bellamy
version of this quarelle turned on whether liberal principles could
be seen as ‘neutral’ or were rather components of a given ac-
count of community in which they served to foster a particular
kind of human agency. My ‘historical argument’ was that an ‘eth-
ical liberal’ tradition had existed that viewed liberalism largely
in such communitarian terms. This conception of liberalism had
formed the dominant strand in bo t hB r i t a i na n dF r a n c ei nt h e
mid-nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries, where favourable
social circumstances had made liberalism appear as the underly-
ing ethos of well-functioning, modern industrial economies. The
discussion of the ‘social question’ at the turn of the century, and
the attempt to give a liberal reading to socialist demands, was par-
ticularly revealing in this respect. By contrast, Italy and Germany
oﬀered far less propitious contexts for the development of liberal
institutions and ideas. Here, as my earlier book on the Italians had
shown, the social and cultural underpinnings of liberalism came
to the fore as liberal thinkers grappled with the issue of how they
might be brought into being. I defended Croce and particularly
Max Weber as the most self-conscious and sophisticated propo-
nents of what, slightly infelicitously, I called the ‘economic liberal’
tradition.
I now think a better term would have been ‘realist’ liberalism.
Weber’s (and, to a degree, Croce’s) liberalism are realist in two
distinct ways. First, they were concerned with liberal reality rather
than simply the liberal ideal. As a result, they appreciated liberal
practices had many, largely contingent, historical origins that were
hard to replicate. Weber also saw that there were features of con-
temporary societies that were either inimical or challenges to ethi-
cal liberalism, even where it had become strongly established–not
least their complexity and growing diﬀerentiation, on the one side,
and the growth of corporate and bureaucratic power, on the other.
Second, these thinkers had a realist, almost Machiavellian, view
of democratic politics. Not only did it possess its own distinctive
logic, and so needed to be separated from ethics and seen as more
than a means to certain ethical ends, but also this feature meant
it could play a role in mediating between competing ethics and
rationalities. I have always rather regretted not writing a histori-
cal chapter on the development of liberalism in the United States
which would have grounded the main analytical liberal theories
in certain preoccupations of the American tradition and politics.
Instead, I moved straight to a discussion of contemporary ‘neutral-
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ethical liberalism. However, pace contemporary communitarians,
I argued the ethical liberal world had always been an idealisa-
tion and had deﬁnitely passed. Far more appropriate for today’s
conditions was a Weberian ‘disenchanted’ and realist democratic
liberalism.
Critics tended to praise the history and be bemused by, pass
over, or be openly hostile to the ﬁnal argument–not seeing that
t h eo n ew a st h eb a s i sf o rt h eo t h e r .A sar e s u l t ,Id e c i d e dt o
take a more direct approach and argued straightforwardly for a
democratic liberalism in my next book Liberalism and Pluralism:
Towards a Politics of Compromise. In developing this case, I drew
inspiration not just from Weber but also the neo-Roman republi-
can theory of non domination discovered by Quentin Skinner and
developed by Philip Pettit. Its focus on power, with arbitrary rule
the cause of domination, served my purpose well. I found a We-
berian echo in Pettit’s insistence that modern societies contains
multiple sources of potentially dominating sources of power that
extended far beyond the organs of the state. However, I added
a concern, also drawn from Weber, with pluralism and the dif-
ﬁculty of reconciling competing values and conceptions of good,
inevitable in a diverse and diﬀerentiated society. In seeing demo-
cratic politics as a means for confronting both issues, I argued for
the liberal qualities of political compromise as echoing the repub-
lican injunction ‘to hear the other side’.
The book had three parts–ﬁrst, a critique of contemporary lib-
eralism’s ﬂight from politics as it sought to go ‘beyond’, somehow
circumscribe, or simply skirt around conﬂict and disagreement;
second, a defence of a republican inspired democratic liberalism,
and the role of compromise within it; and third, an attempt to ap-
ply these insights to the analysis of certain concrete policies that
revealed the weaknesses of the various liberal strategies and the
strengths of my proposed alternative. I suspect few readers felt
moved to engage with all three, with the last part being largely
ignored because of its applied and mainly British focus. I regard
that as unfortunate because part of the case against liberalism
was that it rested on unfounded empirical assumptions that the
case studies served to illuminate. Meanwhile, though the argu-
ment for compromise has attracted both negative and positive
attention, it has usually been detached from its normative basis
in a republican account of non-domination. My latest book, Po-
litical Constitutionalism, which is forthcoming from Cambridge
University Press at the time of writing, attempts to address both22 2. Richard Bellamy
these issues by oﬀering a republican defence of the constitution-
ality of actually existing democracy that criticises explicitly the
normative and empirical shortcomings of legal constitutionalism
of a liberal hue - this time using examples from the USA as much
as the UK.
I have also applied this argument in a number of detailed stud-
ies of the EU, criticising in the process the arguments of David
Held concerning Global Democracy and Habermas’s views of the
potential for a European constitutional patriotism. Instead, I have
argued that we should see the EU as a variation on the republi-
can model of ‘mixed government’. Its key attribute lies in sharing
power between diﬀerent demoi rather than seeking to create a
common demos or unite around common principles of social jus-
tice. Rather, the real achievement of the EU lies in its forcing
a degree of mutual accommodation and ‘hearing the other side’
between the Member States.
What is the proper role of political philosophy in relation to
real, political action? Can there ever be a fruitful relation
between political philosophy and political practice?
My own work has been increasingly concerned with informing and
evaluating contemporary political systems and public policies–
particularly in relation to the EU. However, I suspect my view
of the relations between political theory and political practice is
rather diﬀerent to many contemporary political philosophers. As
the recent concern with relating ideal theory to the real world
suggests, the commonest approach among analytical philosophers
has been with devising principles that reﬂect certain ideal criteria.
Of course, these idealisations often begin validly enough as ab-
stractions that reﬂect criteria implicitly employed to justify many
current practices yet that are incompletely thought through. The
aim is to draw out their consequences and judge social reality
by the values people claim should animate it. However, the pas-
sage from abstraction to idealisation is easy to make and involves
certain fatal distortions. Particular attachments that have force
in the real world get sidelined or simply assumed away, the con-
straints on autonomous agency aﬄicting most people get passed
over, the limitations on practical reasoning when predicting the
eﬀects of most policies are ignored, as are the diﬃculties of getting
agreement on what should be done and how, themselves products
of imperfections in our powers of moral and political reasoning.2. Richard Bellamy 23
As a result, political philosophy can sometimes seem not so much
abstract as abstracted, an irrelevance that makes unwarranted
empirical assumptions as to how things are or could be.
How then does my own approach diﬀer? I think there are three
respects. First, in not taking the process of abstraction so far that
it turns into idealisation. As I noted above, I think one of the key
lessons of the so-called Cambridge School’s historical approach
lay in its seeing how political discourse operates as political ac-
tion. On this account, ideas serve not simply to legitimate actions
undertaken for other, self-interested reasons, but to deﬁne what
interests are and the range of possibilities open for their pursuit.
Much of what goes on in political philosophy is the manipulation
and reworking of dominant discourses. Yet it is rarely portrayed
or fully conceived in these terms. Instead, philosophers have a ten-
dency to argue as if they were dealing in universal truths rather
than battling within and against the limitations of present po-
litical thinking. Ironically, though the search for truth sub specie
aeternitatis can be more a condemnation to an eternal present
than an escape from the restrictions of current thinking. The re-
lationship of political philosophy to its past is instructive in this
respect. A prime target of the Cambridge school was the way many
philosophers saw the history of ideas as a grand dialogue about
certain basic questions of the human condition, in which error
was slowly weeded out and progressively better insights achieved.
Of course, as Croce famously put it, ‘all history is contemporary
history’. Today it is almost impossible not to read Plato through
Rawls, say, and much other later political thought besides. In do-
ing so, though, we are no longer reading Plato as Plato, to the
degree that is possible at all. However, to attempt to do so is not,
as is sometimes charged, mere antiquarianism. It forces a reﬂec-
tion on the present and so extends the range of current political
thinking by leading us to see how diﬀe r e n tp a s tw a y so ft h i n k -
ing and acting have been. Sometimes, as I noted above, it is to
be made aware of how ideas we take for granted actually rest on
theories we ﬁnd strange and possibly untenable or abhorrent. In
t h ep r o c e s s ,w et o oc a nc o m et ot h i n ka n da c td i ﬀe r e n t l yb yb e -
ing brought to challenge dominant discourses. In essence, that is
what Skinner achieved in bringing to light the republican view of
non-domination, unearthing a whole new way of thinking about
liberty and its consequences for political organisation.
Second, political philosophers rightly seek to formulate princi-
ples of justice that can guide policies in given areas–from aﬃrma-24 2. Richard Bellamy
tive action and surrogate motherhood, to global justice and child
poverty. Yet in so doing, they must guard against the temptation
to suggest that politics must be designed purely to deliver their
favoured principles and policies. This instrumental approach to
democracy is all too common. It produces an unwarranted faith in
counter-majoritarian mechanisms, notably constitutional judicial
review — naturally by the ‘right’ sort of judge, guided by the ‘right’
sort of bill of rights and the ‘correct’ interpretation of them — and
a naive faith in the probity and talents of experts of all kinds. For
a start, such attempts to act as philosopher kings, however well
motivated, are dominating. They fail to treat fellow citizens as
equals in unjustiﬁed ways. Philosophers have no epistemological
warrant for their rival ontological claims, nor can they or oth-
ers fully predict the consequences of their proposals. Democratic
processes are required to provide collective decisions with legit-
imacy and to ensure accountability. It allows citizens to choose
on an equal basis between policy proposals and to contest them
when they fail. Turning democracy simply into a means to achieve
favoured ends, to be rejected or curtailed where it fails to deliver,
is to misunderstand the normative role it plays in preventing ar-
bitrary rule, overcoming disagreement and reconciling citizens to
common projects.
More generally, how decisions are made is as important an is-
sue as who gets what, where and when. Political philosophers have
given too much attention to identifying what seem to them desir-
able frameworks or outcomes, too little to the procedures whereby
decisions are made and the dispositions of those making them. If
the best outcome proves disputable or hard to identify, all that
can be hoped for is that those who take decisions do so as re-
sponsibly as possible — aware of their limitations — and can be
encouraged to rectify their mistakes when they appear. The ap-
propriate processes and attitudes are likely to vary according to
the public role an individual plays — citizens act diﬀerently to
politicians, scientists to bureaucrats or generals, and so on. And
such public virtues may diverge tremendously from those suitable
in the private sphere, so that private virtue can become public
vice.
Third, political philosophy needs to be much more informed by
social science. To a degree many are aware of the more theoreti-
cal branches of economics, but political philosophers tend to take
little or no interest in political science. If many political scientists
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assumptions that pervade their work, then political philosophers
can be charged for ignoring the often contentious empirical as-
sumptions that underlie theirs. However, if empirical studies of
politics that eschew normative theories are blind and lack a sense
of where they ought to be headed, political philosophies that are
formulated in ignorance of the way political and legal institutions
and policies actually work prove empirically empty and so unable
to make their ideals engage with reality.
So to sum up, I think we can relate political philosophy to po-
litical action only if political philosophers are sensitive to the lan-
guages of politics and self-conscious about the ways their argu-
ments abstract from yet engage with past and present discourses,
seeking at the same time to avoid empty idealisations; approach
their own proposals with due humility and see politics as hav-
ing intrinsic merits of its own rather than as a mere means to
implement those ends they ﬁnd desirable; and engage with empir-
ical work in the social sciences so that their theories are informed
by knowledge about how social, economic and political processes
work.
What do you consider the most neglected topics and/or
contributions in late 20th century political philosophy, or in
related philosophical disciplines (ethics, philosophy of law,
metaethics etc.)?
Though there are signs of change, I think political philosophers
have tended to ignore theorists and theories of politics, law and
society relative to theorists and theories of justice. So the basic
courses have tended to ignore Machiavelli and the political writ-
ings of Hume, say, rarely teach Durkheim and Weber, and cer-
tainly not their political writings, include Dworkin but not Hart
and so on. Likewise, philosophers tend to teach courses on pro-
fessional and public ethics for non-philosophers–business studies
and public management students on the whole, rather than see-
ing these topics as part of a political philosophy programme. The
result, as I said above, is a curious disengagement with actual po-
litical processes, while oﬀering ever more grandiose schemes for
improving the world that bear little or no relation to what is ever
likely to happen.26 2. Richard Bellamy
What are the most important unsolved questions in politi-
cal philosophy and/or related disciplines and what are the
prospects for progress?
I ﬁnd this question almost unintelligible. I do not think there are
unsolved political questions in the sense, say, that there are un-
solved mathematical ones. The history of the discipline is the ask-
ing of diﬀerent questions and the proﬀering of diﬀerent answers,
with this questioning and answering shaping and being shaped by
the evolution of politics and society–much of which is entirely
open and unpredictable. So, it’s clear that philosophers will con-
tinue to oﬀer variations on the questions and answers that are
preoccupy us at present, while moving into new areas we can-
not as yet imagine. I certainly have indicated what I hope they
will do–re-engage with their past, with social science, and with
politics in all its dimensions. How far events force such moves is
another matter. However, I suspect the growing turmoil in the
Middle East is liable to do so. Here we have issues that cannot be
simply seen as matters of ‘social justice’ and where the need to
engage a diﬀerent tradition of political thinking should make us
more reﬂective about our own. How far that happens may turn
o u tt ob eo fm o r et h a na c a d e m i co rd i s c i p l i n a r yi n t e r e s t .
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Why I was drawn to Political Philosophy
I entered graduate school in 1971, with little or no interest in
Political Philosophy, intending to study the highly technical Phi-
losophy of Language. A combination of factors eventually led me
to redirect my attention toward Moral and Political Philosophy.
I had grown up in the American South during a period in which
it was literally an Apartheid society, still characterized by insti-
tutionalized racism and violence toward Blacks. As I began to be-
come more critical toward that environment, my appreciation of
the importance of social and political institutions began to grow.
The cultural and political turmoil of the 1960s stimulated me to
begin to be deeply suspicious of the belief structure and system
of values into which I had been socialized. I came to the disturb-
ing conclusion that the basic institutions of my society — family,
church, school, and government — were deeply implicated in social
injustice and helped to perpetuate it by producing prejudiced, un-
reﬂective individuals. Some of the grosser injustices of my society
began to become visible to me; and I was deeply disturbed that
until then they had been invisible to me–and continued to be
invisible to most of the people I knew.
I concluded that I had to extricate myself from this noxious
environment at the earliest opportunity. I was able to do so, at
the age of 18, by entering Columbia University in New York City
on an academic scholarship. My undergraduate studies there from
1966 to 1970 exposed me not only to the great social and political
thinkers of the Western tradition, but also gave me the opportu-
nity to study non-Western civilizations and literatures by taking
courses with professors in Columbia’s renowned Oriental Studies